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Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate

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This article examines the role progressive ambition plays in the U.S. Senate. I analyze the effect ambition has on party loyalty in the upper chamber. The theoretical argument is that senators with ambition for higher office are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office because of their need to appeal to the party base to secure the party's nomination. I posit the following hypothesis to test this theory: A senator who seeks higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than those senators who never run for the presidency. My findings indicate that ambitious senators are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. That is, senators who run for higher office recognize the importance of the party when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season.

Keywords: *ambition; party loyalty; higher office; Senate*

In the United States, the ultimate political ambition manifests itself as a desire to be president. This ambition reveals itself most clearly in the U.S. Senate, where senators often view their time spent in the upper chamber as a way to achieve their political ambitions for the presidency (Hess, 1986; Polsby, 1989). Polsby (1989) states, "Today the Senate is the main institutional source of presidential hopefuls, and for a large fraction of senators such hopes play a significant part in guiding their behavior in the Senate" (p. 789). As such, the Senate, where many individuals view themselves as presidential timber, is an ideal place to test the effect of political ambition on party loyalty. In presidential elections from 1988 to 2004, a total of 10 former or current senators appeared on the general election ballot as either a candidate for president or vice president. If these dates are extended back to 1972, 16 former or current senators appeared on a presidential ballot,

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making the Senate the most highly represented elected office to appear on a presidential ticket. More recently, both the major party candidates for the 2008 presidential election are sitting senators. Running for president while serving in the Senate presents a unique challenge for candidates. They must simultaneously appeal to the national party in order to raise funds and win votes in primary elections and present a message that appeals to moderate voters throughout the country to be "electable"—all while trying to keep the constituents in their home state happy. Although this is no doubt a difficult challenge for senators seeking the presidency, for my purposes this challenge is ideal as it allows me to use the Senate to study the effects of ambition for the presidency on party loyalty in the Senate.

No candidate demonstrates the difficulty of running for president from the Senate more than Senator John McCain (R-AZ). A large part of McCain's appeal as a general election candidate comes from his reputation as a "maverick" in the Senate who is willing to stand up to the leaders of his party to vote and advocate for policies that are not consistent with the Republican party's agenda in the Senate. However, he has paid a steep price for this reputation, as the resistance of some conservative activists to his 2008 presidential candidacy illustrates. Although McCain managed to secure the Republican party nomination, there continues to be a hailstorm of resistance to him from some conservatives within the party. Rush Limbaugh, whose conservative radio show reaches more than 13.5 million listeners a week, continues to berate McCain for betraying conservative principles by voting against tax cuts, by supporting campaign finance reform, and for not being tough enough on illegal immigration. Ann Coulter has also spoken out against McCain, going so far as to say she would rather vote for Hillary Clinton (D-NY) than McCain. According to *Newsweek*, when Coulter was asked if there was anything McCain could do to convince her to change her mind she responded that "McCain could invent a time machine and take back all of his liberal-leaning votes in Congress."[1] Though conservative talk show hosts and listeners are unlikely to vote for the Democratic candidate because they are unhappy with their party's candidate, Limbaugh frequently notes that ever since McCain emerged as the likely nominee, callers insist that they plan to stay home on Election Day in November.[2] Although pundits often speculate that the Republicans will eventually come around on McCain once the primary season is over, there is little doubt that not being a loyal member of the party has alienated him from an influential portion of the Republican base.

In the other major party, Barack Obama (D-IL) secured the Democratic nomination, but only after a tough primary contest and the wooing of party

superdelegates. With neither Obama nor Hillary Clinton (D-NY) able to attain the 2,118 delegates needed from primaries and caucuses, the focus of the primary moved to the party's insiders—the superdelegates—governors, senators, and other party leaders. Throughout the Democratic primary, many voters, pundits, and even some superdelegates themselves lamented that the Democratic nomination could come down to superdelegates, the party insiders who represent the party organization in the nominating process.

The Hunt Commission set up superdelegates in 1982 and according to Mann and Ornstein (2008),[3] The Hunt Commission proposed superdelegates to improve the party's mainstream appeal by moderating the new dominance of activists and by increasing the contributions of elected and party officials to the Democratic platform and their impact on the selection of a nominee; to provide an element of peer review, weighing the requirements of the office, the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates, and the chances that they'll win; and to create stronger ties between the party and its elected officials to promote a unified campaign and teamwork in government. The 2008 presidential battles in both the Democratic and Republican parties indicate that the relationship between a senator's constituents' preferences and the senator's desire for higher office is a complex interaction for candidates. Similarly, the conflicting values of "winning in November" versus maintaining ideological purity in nominating are difficult to bridge for party insiders.

In what follows, I test Herrick and Moore's (1993) assertion that political ambition may alter roll-call behavior. I expect that the link between ambition and party loyalty will be positive, as progressively ambitious senators must first win the support of their party before seeking to win the support of a larger constituency (Fenno, 1978). By focusing on one potential motivation for party loyalty, namely ambition for higher office, the findings I present have important implications for models of party unity in the Senate.

Parties in Congress

Recently, the most compelling debate in the congressional literature has been over the effect of legislative parties on the behavior of party members (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2005; Krehbiel, 1993, 1998; Rohde, 1991). Without parties, legislators face a chaotic and unpredictable agenda, and thus, legislators form parties to join themselves together into reliable coalitions (Aldrich, 1995; Schwartz, 1977; Smith & Gamm, 2001). An alternate theory of party formation is that parties are created primarily to reap electoral gains. In this case, parties

provide politicians with a brand name to ensure that the typical problems associated with providing a public good are overcome, and that legislative actions can foster valuable reputations (Cox, 1987; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Evans & Oleszek, 2002; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Strøm, 1990). Once parties are formed, one of the best-known models to explain how parties discipline their members is the conditional party government model (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rohde, 2001; Rohde, 1991). This model posits that more power is delegated to party leaders when the differences between the parties are great and preferences are homogenous within the party.

Whereas the conditional party government model contributes to our understanding of responsible party government, another theory is based on the majority party's ability to control the legislative agenda. The work of Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) views parties as procedural cartels, which monopolize the agenda by creating and filling agenda-setting offices, filling the agenda with bills that will not split the party, and getting rank and file congressmen to support the agenda (Cox & McCubbins, 2005). This model posits a strong and cohesive party—a party that votes as a block.

Although these models clearly articulate how this process works in the House, they do not appear to fit as well in the Senate (but see Brady, 2002; Campbell, Cox, & McCubbins, 2002). There is some evidence to suggest that party effects are present in the Senate, but they are very different and more varied than party effects observed in the House (Lawrence, Maltzman, & Smith, 2006; Monroe, Roberts, & Rohde, 2008). The primary reason for the lack of scholarly research on the Senate is that some of the technical models and theories used to examine House procedure and behavior have not traveled well to the upper chamber. In contrast to the House, the Senate has a weak presiding officer and the Senate's rules provide less structure on floor proceedings. Each senator—including the leader of each party—is a formal equal, so majority party status is often less significant than in the lower chamber. Further, the 6-year term in office insulates senators from the constant electoral pressure faced by their House counterparts. In addition, the supermajority cloture requirement and the lack of a general germaneness rule hamper the ability of Senate majorities to control the agenda.

Although the party effects in the U.S. House literature are extensive, there has been less attention given to the role of parties in the Senate. Smith (2007) argues that neither conditional party government and cartel theory, nor pivotal politics theories can adequately account for party in the upper chamber. According to Smith, conditional party government emphasizes rule changes that never occurred in the Senate; cartel theory predicts low majority party roll rates on parliamentary procedure, but the majority party in the Senate

does not control the floor agenda; and pivotal politics theory predicts supermajority thresholds that are not relevant in everyday floor action in the Senate. Although institutional constraints have made it difficult for models of the House to work for the Senate, a complete model of congressional procedure or behavior requires taking the upper chamber into account.

I argue that to explain party in the Senate (or lack thereof), scholars need to look at the role ambition for higher office (i.e., the presidency) plays in the upper chamber and its effect on party unity. By analyzing the role ambition plays in the Senate and, more important, how it affects party unity, we can gain a clearer picture of what determines the success of parties in the Senate. That is, we can begin to develop a picture of when party in the Senate resembles party in the House and when it might look and function quite differently than the lower chamber.

Analyzing parties from the level of the individual is especially salient in the Senate, as many individual party members aspire to hold higher office and individual senators have more power. As noted above, a senator who is considering a run for the presidency needs to convince the party organization that he or she is a loyal partisan, and what better way to do so than by voting as a loyal partisan on the floor? This theoretical argument is supported by Jacobson (2004) who notes that increasingly, members of Congress are finding it beneficial to be loyal to their parties because of the expanded role of national party committees, leadership PACs, and other allied PACs in the recruiting, training, and financing of candidates. Considering this, it naturally follows that a senator's ambition for higher office may influence his party loyalty on floor votes. That is, those senators who see themselves as one day needing national party support for a presidential campaign may be more susceptible to party leaders who distribute the party's funds (Jacobson, 2004).[4]

Political Ambition

Research on the causes of political ambition has been conducted since the 1960s when Joseph Schlesinger (1966) wrote about three different types of ambition in his classic study *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.* For Schlesinger, a political actor who seeks higher office is labeled as having "progressive ambition."[5] The basic assumption in ambition theory is that politicians are rational actors who make political decisions consonant with their political ambitions to maximize the probability of realizing their ambitions. Expanding on Schlesinger's model of the causes of ambition, Rohde (1979) developed a model to predict when a

member of the House would run for higher office (i.e., when a member should act on ambition). This model is an improvement over Schlesinger's model because Rohde uses a sample of all members—not just those who sought higher office. Brace (1984) confirms and furthers Rohde's study by showing that there are important factors, including electoral vulnerability and risk acceptance, that help determine whether a member will run for higher office. Extending this rational choice model to the Senate, it is likely that senators are more prone to make a bid for the presidency when the costs of running are low, when the candidate has no potential liabilities, and when the candidate is risk acceptant.

Research on the factors contributing to (i.e., the causes of) political ambition is prolific (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Brace, 1984; Rohde, 1979; Schlesinger, 1966). However, few works have analyzed the *consequences* of political ambition. In one such study of progressive ambition, Hibbing (1986) shows that ambitious House members alter their roll-call voting behavior in the 2 years leading up to their bid for higher office and that these same Congressmen in the House participate less on floor votes. Herrick and Moore (1993) also hypothesize that ambition will affect roll-call behavior, though they do not speculate as to the direction of the relationship. They find progressive ambition increases floor activity, the number of bills introduced, and legislative specialization for members of the House. Victor (2005) extends the work of Hibbing and Herrick and Moore and examines the effect of ambition on other types of legislative behavior (constituency service, committee service, floor speeches, etc.) in the U.S. House. By accounting for other types of legislative behavior, she finds, similarly to Herrick and Moore that higher office seekers engage in *more* legislative activity than the nonambitious.

Although the works of Hibbing (1986), Herrick and Moore (1993), and Victor (2005) shed light on the consequences of political ambition, they only look at the House and none of the authors examine the relationship between progressive ambition and party loyalty. To analyze this relationship, I develop a more complete model of the consequences of ambition—a model that captures more than just a congressman's success at attaining higher office. After all, if ambition is a personality construct, as Schlesinger suggests, it should not matter whether or not the ambitious office seeker is electorally rewarded in his bid for higher office. Thus, I expand past work on ambition, looking not just at the way ambition affects the legislative behavior of individual congressmen, but at how ambition may affect the entire party within the chamber. After all, if progressive ambition affects roll call votes as past literature suggests, it is reasonable to expect ambitious senators may affect the party.

Although prior research on the consequences of ambition is somewhat mixed, the theoretical argument that ambitious senators affect party in the Senate is compelling. First, studies tell us that ambition is a personality construct and is, therefore, seen in an individual's behavior (Herrick & Moore 1993; Hibbing, 1991). Thus, senators with ambition for the presidency may behave differently than those without such ambitions. Senators seeking the presidency should want to expand their audience beyond their own constituents to potential presidential primary and general election voters. Senators content with their present position should simply want to please their current constituency.[6] As Schlesinger notes, "the central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" (1966, p. 6). This suggests that an ambitious senator must engage in behavior that will make him a national party figure and win him national backing, and not just a single-state constituency. Senators who seek the presidency will continue to engage in Mayhew's (1974) position taking, credit claiming, and advertising, but they must partake in these activities in such a way that simultaneously allows them to reach out to the party's base across the country.

Second, there is some evidence that party affects roll rates in both the House and Senate, despite the agenda control process working differently in the two chambers (Cox & McCubbins 2005; Cox & Poole, 2002; Lawrence et al., 2006). That is, party affects the majority party's ability to win on legislation. Knowing this, it seems plausible that a senator who sees himself as a future president may positively affect the party's ability to control the agenda and legislate effectively. This is because an ambitious senator recognizes the importance of winning the party's constituency to win the party's nomination. Jenkins, Crespin, & Carson (2005) find that "higher-office seekers" in the House are more tied to the party than their retiring colleagues who are free to vote their personal preferences. As they (2005) note

> [H]igher office seekers, while exiting the House, have another elective office in their sights, and campaign for that office under their traditional party banner. As a result, they endeavor to maintain good relations with the *national* [italics added] party hierarchy for a variety of campaign-related reasons and strive to send signals that they are loyal party members. (p. 370)

Extending the work of Jenkins et al. (2005) to the Senate, it seems plausible that senators seeking the presidency are more likely to feel constrained by the party and to vote with the party because they recognize the need for the party's support. That is, for ambitious senators, the party's support and primary voters may be what determine party voting in the upper chamber.

Hypothesis

The theoretical argument that ambitious senators are apt to appeal to the party in order to secure its support suggests that these senators will be more loyal to the party on floor votes. That is, an ambitious senator recognizes the need to appeal to the party with the hopes of winning the party's presidential nomination and securing the party's support.[7] After all, in the age of the primary, it is necessary for a senator to convince the party that he is the best candidate in order to have the opportunity to convince the general electorate. Keeping this in mind, my theory suggests that ambition affects party loyalty in a positive direction. Thus, I test one primary hypothesis:

Party Loyalty Hypothesis: A senator who runs for the presidency will vote differently than her colleagues who do not make a bid for the presidency, holding all else equal. Because the senator needs to win her party's primary and the party's support to gain higher office, the directional expectation is that those senators who seek higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than their colleagues who never run for the presidency.

Data and Analysis

To test this hypothesis, I analyze U.S. senators from 1963 to 2004 to capture an entire senator's career and not just the time immediately before a presidential campaign. This is crucial for ambition theory because, as Schlesinger (1966) notes, ambition may only become evident when examining an entire career. The data set begins with the 88th Congress so that it includes only those ambitious senators who ran for president under the McGovern–Fraser Commission.[8] I select my cases by using the freshman class of senators from the 88th to 108th Congresses. Each of the senators in the analysis was elected to the Senate between 1962 and 2004.[9] Although it can be argued that all senators enter their careers with aspirations for the presidency, in reality, this data set of freshman senators will provide an array of levels of ambition.

During this time period there were 267 freshman senators who did not have prior Senate service. The appendix shows the number of senators examined in each of the Congresses using the selection method discussed above. Of the 267 senators examined, 32 make a bid for the presidency, with 9 making it onto a presidential ticket (either as a presidential or as a vice presidential candidate), and 23 running in a presidential primary.[10]

The unit of analysis is each senator in each Congress. The dependent variable is the senator's *party unity* score obtained from *Congressional Quarterly*

corrected for abstentions. According to *Congressional Quarterly*, a party unity vote is defined as one where at least 50% of Democrats vote against at least 50% of Republicans. The expectation is that loyalty to the party on party votes will depend on whether or not the senator is "progressively ambitious." The primary independent variable of interest is *political ambition.* This variable is coded 1 if the senator ran for the presidency and 0 otherwise. Also included in one or more of the models are control variables for presidential vote in each state, divided government, whether or not the senator is a member of the majority party, and whether or not the senator is a party leader. The variable *divided government* controls for the argument that when the Senate is controlled by the opposite party of the president, gridlock may occur more frequently. The variable *majority party* controls for the argument that if a senator is a member of the majority party he may be more likely to vote with the party. The variable *party leader* controls for the argument that party leaders are more likely to vote with the party.[11]

To test my expectations about the effect of ambition on party loyalty, I estimate fixed effects within regression model.[12] The fixed effects model allows for the imposing of time independent effects for each individual. In this case, fixed effects allow for the estimation of the average change in party loyalty from Congress to Congress. Because I have multiple observations for each senator, I calculate robust standard errors, clustering on each senator to control for correlated errors across multiple observations. The estimated coefficient and its corresponding robust standard error are reported in Tables 1 and 2.

Results

According to the model, running for higher office at any point in time while in the Senate leads to an 11.726 ($p = .001$) unit increase in a senator's party unity score as compared with senators who never make a bid for higher office.[13] This suggests that those senators who run for the presidency are more likely to vote with the party on party votes. From a theoretical perspective this makes sense, as ambitious senators recognize the potential need for party support and do not want to risk alienating the party or partisan primary voters.

Also from the model, we can see that divided government significantly decreases party loyalty. This indicates that under divided government, senators may be more likely to compromise in order to pass legislation. Furthermore, and as expected, being a member of the majority party increases a senator's party unity score. Being a party leader also increases a senator's party unity score, though this result is not statistically significant.

Table 1
Running for Higher Office and Party Loyalty

Variable	Model 1 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)	Model 2 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)
Ran for higher office	11.726*	11.922*
	(2.204)	(2.248)
Divided government	–1.642*	–1.673*
	(0.508)	(0.504)
Majority party	1.759*	1.757*
	(0.435)	(0.436)
Party leader	1.393	1.308
	(1.509)	(1.519)
Presidential vote in state by senator's party		–0.017
		(0.070)
Intercept	84.891*	85.777*
	(2.142)	(2.921)
Number of cases	1552	1552
Number of senators	267	267
R^2	0.847	0.847

Note: The dependent variable is the party unity score. Cell entries are fixed effects within regression coefficients with panel corrected, robust standard errors.
*$p \leq .05$.

Table 2 presents the results for the model that takes into account whether or not the senator is the party's presidential nominee. The theoretical justification for this model is that some senators might run for higher office for a reason other than an actual desire to become president (e.g., they wish to draw attention to a particular issue). Thus, this model provides a way to sort out the "serious" from the less-serious. This model includes a variable that indicates whether the senator won the party's nomination. The results indicate, similar to the results from Table 1, that running in a presidential primary increases a senator's party unity score by 11.726 units ($p = .001$), as compared with the senator's colleagues who did not enter a presidential primary. Additionally, gaining the party's nomination corresponds to an 8.318 ($p = .006$) increase in the senator's party unity score. This indicates that senators who are loyal to the party are more likely to last through the primary season and gain the approval of the party and the party's electorate. These results suggest that senators who are the most successful in their campaign for the party's nomination are also more loyal to the party on party votes than their colleagues who do not seek higher office. These findings reinforce Fenno's

Table 2
Winning the Nomination and Party Loyalty

Variable	Model 1 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)	Model 2 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)
Divided government	−1.642*	−1.673*
	(0.508)	(0.504)
Majority party	1.759*	1.757*
	(0.435)	(0.436)
Party leader	1.393	1.308
	(1.509)	(1.519)
Ran in a presidential primary	11.726*	11.922*
	(2.204)	(2.248)
Party's nominee	8.318*	8.201*
	(3.010)	(3.036)
Presidential vote in state by senator's party		–0.017
		(0.037)
Intercept	84.891*	85.777*
	(2.142)	(2.921)
Number of cases	1552	1552
Number of senators	267	267
R^2	0.847	0.847

Note: The dependent variable is the party unity score. Cell entries are fixed effects within regression coefficients with panel corrected, robust standard errors.
*$p \leq .05$.

(1978) assertion that senators must first win the support of their party before seeking to win the support of a larger constituency.

I also fit models to account for the presidential vote in each state.[14] The theoretical argument is that depending on the partisanship of the senator's state he may be more (or less) likely to need to alter his party loyalty solely due to ambition for higher office. That is, if a senator comes from a fairly moderate state, it may be inaccurate to expect a change in his party loyalty due to ambition. However, the inclusion of this variable has no discernible effect. When presidential vote is included in the first model a Chow test with one degree of freedom reveals a χ^2 of 0.26, which is not enough to reject the null hypothesis that the variable *ran for higher office* is equal in the two equations ($p = .610$). This indicates senators from states that tend to share their party preferences are not necessarily more likely to run for higher office than their colleagues from less compatible states.[15] The results for these models can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, alongside the initial models.

Discussion

The results indicate that senators who run for higher office are more loyal to the party on party votes than their colleagues who do not make a bid for the presidency. Additionally, those senators who win the party's nomination have higher party unity scores than those senators who never advance beyond the party's primary. These findings suggest that progressively ambitious senators who are also the most successful in their bid for higher office have higher party unity scores than their similar colleagues who never make a bid for the presidency. This could be due to the fact that senators who hope to one day find themselves in the White House recognize the importance of the party in helping them reach that goal. That is, senators who come into the Senate with progressive ambition understand the importance of the party's support when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season. These findings confirm the Party Loyalty Hypothesis, which posits that because a senator needs to win her party's primary in order to gain higher office, a progressively ambitious senator will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes in order to gain the support of the party.

By taking progressive ambition into account in the Senate, this article shows that for ambitious senators, the need for the party's future support may have a rather substantial influence on party voting in the upper chamber. Future research on the work of party loyalty in the Senate needs to address the effect ambition has on party cohesion. My results suggest that having numerous ambitious senators in any given Congress may increase the overall party unity in the caucus. This suggests that progressive ambition is a potential tool the party can use to control its members. If the party can tempt progressively ambitious senators with party support, the party may be able to glean greater loyalty in the upper chamber. This could have implications for any model of party effects in the Senate. Additionally, future work could apply these insights to the House.

This article argues that by adding progressive ambition as a tool that the parties in the Senate can use to achieve the votes it needs, we may gain a better understanding of party in the upper chamber. Ambitious senators, especially those who turn out to be the most successful, are more loyal to the party on party votes than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. Recognizing the importance of the party in winning the presidential primary, progressively ambitious senators have higher party unity scores than senators who do not run for the presidency. This research also has electoral implications, as it suggests that senators are aware that the party organization rewards party loyalty.

Appendix
Cases by Congress[16]

Congress	Number of Senators Examined	Number of Higher Office Seekers Examined
88th	10	3
89th	18	6
90th	24	8
91st	38	9
92nd	47	10
93rd	57	10
94th	61	12
95th	75	13
96th	81	15
97th	87	14
98th	89	14
99th	92	17
100th	93	17
101st	95	18
102nd	97	18
103rd	97	16
104th	99	16
105th	97	13
106th	99	12
107th	98	12
108th	98	11
Total	1552	264

Notes

1. "So Much for a Warm Welcome," *Newsweek* February 18, 2008, 27.

2. "Warring on McCain, Limbaugh Sees No Reconciliation," *The New York Times* February 15, 2008, A19.

3. "Delegates of Steel," *The New York Times* February 15, 2008, A23.

4. It should be noted that the literature on national party resources and party unity in Congress is quite limited. Thus far, all of the literature in this area focuses on the House and these results remain inconclusive. However, Hershey and Beck (2003) successfully identify a number of campaign-related services and resources that national party organizations provide candidates, suggesting connecting party unity to ambition for higher office is an area worthy of further research.

5. Schlesinger also examines what he labels discrete and static ambition. Both of these types of ambition suggest a satisfaction with the status quo and therefore are not examined here. Herrick and Moore (1993) added a fourth type of ambition to Schlesinger's work: institutional ambition. This type of ambition has to do with the Congressman's desire to hold leadership positions within the chamber. However, because I analyze ambition in the Senate and each senator, even those holding "leadership positions" is a formal equal, I will not address this type of ambition here.

6. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) work on party brand name is also an important factor to consider when thinking about how an ambitious or less-ambitious senator may behave in relation to the party.

7. Although one could argue that endogeneity is a problem in this analysis, I suggest that because Schlesinger's (1966) theory argues that ambition is a personality construct and not something created overtime, ambition is nascent. For this reason, it seems unlikely that party loyalty leads to ambition. After all, it is unlikely that a senator needs to be convinced to run for the presidency or that the senator comes into office without any plans for the future.

8. There are two senators in the data set who ran for the presidency before the McGovern–Fraser Commission. These two senators are Daniel B. Brewster (D-MD) and Robert F. Kennedy (D-MA). Dropping these two senators from the data set does not change the results, so I chose to include them.

9. Senators who had previously served in the Senate were excluded.

10. If a senator made a bid for higher office more than once, I coded his first attempt at running for the presidency.

11. I also fit each of the models to include a variable *state presidential vote.* This variable is coded as the percentage of the state's electorate that voted for the presidential candidate of the senator's party in the last presidential election. This variable controls for the argument some senators may have an easier time voting with their party if their state leans strongly toward the senator's party.

12. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each of my cases and including them in a standard linear regression to control for the fixed "case effects."

13. Party unity is measured on a 0 to 100 scale. The party unity mean for senators in the data set is 81.67 with a standard deviation of 16.18. The variable ranges from 6.50 to 100.

14. For these models, Harry Flood Byrd, Jr. and James Jeffords were both coded as Democrats and James Lane Buckley was coded as a Republican. Byrd left the Democratic Party in 1970 and became an Independent, although he continued to caucus with the Democrats. Jeffords became an Independent in 2001 and chose to caucus with the Democrats. Before 2001 he was a Republican, but his voting record was always moderate to liberal, which is typical of New England Republicans. Buckley was elected to the Senate as a member of the Conservative Party of New York in 1970. After moving to Connecticut, he received the Republican nomination for the Senate in 1980, but lost to current senator Democrat Christopher Dodd. Omitting these three senators from the analysis does not change the results and therefore I decided to keep them in.

15. In the second model, which includes a variable indicating whether the senator won the party's nomination, a Chow test suggests that the variables may be equal in the two equations. In the second model, a Chow test with one degree of freedom gives a χ^2 of 18.28 ($p = .001$) for the variable *party's nominee.* This value is not large enough to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are equal in the two equations.

16. *Number of senators examined* refers to the number of senators in the data set for each given Congress. For example, in the 89th Congress there were nine freshman senators and one retiree, Pierre Salinger (D-CA), who was elected in a special election on August 4, 1964 and ended service in the Senate on December 31, 1964 with the election of George Murphy (R-CA). Thus, the number of senators in the data set for the 89th Congress is 18. *Number of higher office seekers examined* indicates the number of senators in the given Congress that made a bid for the presidency at some point in their career. It is not necessary that the senator ran for higher office in the given Congress, only that he ran at some point.

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